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The	Diplomat	August	23,	2012	http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/much-ado-about-the-sansha-garrison/		In	June,	Beijing	raised	the	“administrative	status	of	the	Xisha,	Zhongsha	and	Nansha	islands”	from	a	county-level	administrative	office	to	prefectural-level	city	named	Sansha	based	on	Woody	(Yongxing)	Island	in	the	Paracels	(Xisha)	archipelago	in	the	South	China	Sea.	In	July,	the	People’s	Liberation	Army	(PLA)	established	a	division-level	garrison	in	the	newly	created	city	also	based	on	Woody	Island.	Analysts	and	pundits	have	viewed	the	announcement	of	the	new	garrison	with	alarm.		One	analyst	viewed	the	decision	as	“a	sign	of	[China’s]	growing	reliance	on	hard	power”	in	the	South	China	Sea.		Another	commentator	equated	the	announcement	with	a	decision	to	create	“a	permanent	forward-deployed	military	force	within	striking	distance	of	such	contested	waters,”	a	view	echoed	by	the	New	
York	Times.		Still	others	suggested	that	a	division	of	at	least	6,000	soldiers	would	be	deployed	to	the	region	and	that	the	garrison	might	command	units	from	the	PLA	Air	Force	and	Navy.	Such	conclusions,	however,	are	misplaced.		In	particular,	they	misunderstand	the	role	of	garrisons	(jingbeiqu,	also	called	garrison	commands	or	garrison	headquarters)	in	the	PLA	and	how	China	has	organized	the	defense	of	the	islands	and	reefs	it	controls	in	the	South	China	Sea.		From	a	military	perspective,	the	significance	of	Sansha	garrison	should	not	be	overstated.		Alone,	it	will	not	lead	to	an	increase	in	combat	units	in	the	region	nor	does	it	portend	a	new	effort	by	China	to	militarize	the	disputes	in	the	South	China	Sea.	In	the	PLA,	division-level	military	garrisons	do	not	command	main	force	combat	units	such	as	infantry	or	armored	divisions	or	brigades.		They	also	do	not	command	PLA	Navy	or	PLA	Air	Force	units.		Instead,	as	described	in	China’s	2006	white	paper	on	defense,	garrisons	and	other	division-level	military	sub-districts	(junfenqu,	also	called	prefectural	military	commands)	are	administrative	headquarters	established	in	major	cities	responsible	for	supporting	the	military	work	conducted	by	the	municipality,	such	as	conscription	and	national	defense	mobilization	tasks.	Garrisons	and	military	sub-districts	fall	under	provincial-level	military	districts	(shengjunqu)	and	are	jointly	commanded	by	the	municipality’s	party	committee	and	government.	As	with	division-level	units,	they	are	headed	by	Army	senior	colonels,	who	are	assisted	by	a	handful	of	staff	officers.	Depending	on	their	location,	garrisons	and	military	sub-districts	may	command	PLA	border	defense	units	(up	to	regimental	size)	that	share	responsibility	with	civilian	public	security	forces	(gong’an	budui)	for	guarding	China’s	borders	and	providing	early	warning	of	an	attack.	
By	our	count,	the	PLA	now	has	about	39	division-level	garrisons	and	nearly	another	300	military	sub-district	headquarters	throughout	China.	In	addition,	there	are	four	corps-level	garrisons	in	the	centrally	administered	cities	of	Beijing,	Tianjin,	Shanghai,	and	Chongqing,	and	the	Hong	Kong	and	Macau	Garrisons,	which	report	directly	to	Central	Military	Commission.	Comparatively	speaking,	at	the	same	organizational	level,	the	PLA	Army	currently	has	only	about	31	infantry	and	armored	combat	divisions	(though	the	number	of	combat	brigades	one	step	below	a	division	has	increased	to	roughly	50).		The	PLA	has	far	more	division-level	organizations	than	combat-ready	divisions.		Thus,	by	itself,	the	establishment	of	division-level	garrison	such	as	the	one	for	Sansha	does	not	suggest	the	deployment	of	large	numbers	of	forces.	In	short,	create	a	city	or	other	prefectural-level	administrative	unit	in	China	and	a	garrison	or	military	sub-district	will	often	be	established	as	well.		The	Sansha	garrison	is	merely	the	newest	among	hundreds	of	division-level	organizations	in	the	entire	PLA.	One	report	noted	that	the	new	garrison	had	been	upgraded	from	People’s	Armed	Forces	Department	(wuzhuangbu)	that	was	part	of	the	previous	county-level	administrative	office.		Moreover,	consistent	with	the	2006	white	paper,	the	Ministry	of	Defense	spokesman	stated	that	the	responsibilities	of	the	new	Sansha	garrison	were	“defense	mobilization…	city	guard,	support	for	the	city’s	disaster	rescue	and	relief	work,	and	[direction	of]	militia	and	reserve	troops.”	So	far,	no	border	defense	units	have	been	assigned	to	the	Sansha	garrison.		Instead,	the	existing	Xisha	(Paracels)	maritime	garrison	under	the	PLAN’s	South	Sea	Fleet	is	responsible	for	the	actual	defense	of	the	islands	in	the	South	China	Sea	under	China’s	control.		The	Paracels	maritime	garrison	is	one	of	six	division-level	maritime	garrisons	(shuijingqu)	that	fall	under	the	command	of	one	of	the	three	regional	fleets	in	the	PLA	Navy.		Maritime	garrisons	are	responsible	for	conducting	defensive	operations	(fangwei	zuozhan)	in	their	designated	area	and	may	command	PLAN	combat	units.	nextpage	Although	it	is	not	clear	when	the	Paracels	maritime	garrison	was	established,	reports	of	the	unit	first	appeared	in	the	Chinese	press	in	1985.		Nevertheless,	China’s	deployment	of	troops	to	the	South	China	Sea	began	almost	three	decades	earlier,	in	the	1950s	when	the	PLA	occupied	Woody	Island	in	the	Amphitrite	Group	of	the	Paracels.		Following	several	confrontations	with	South	Vietnamese	forces	in	the	Crescent	Group	of	the	Paracels	in	the	mid-1950s,	Premier	Zhou	Enlai	in	1959	instructed	the	PLA	to	establish	a	base	on	Woody	Island	and	in	1960	regular	patrols	around	the	Paracels	were	initiated.		In	1971,	the	PLAN	began	to	upgrade	and	expand	the	infrastructure	in	the	Paracels,	which	has	continued	steadily	until	to	the	present	day	and	includes	a	military-capable	airfield	built	over	20	years	ago.	To	date,	there	has	been	little	to	no	evidence	that	the	airfield	has	been	used	to	accommodate	“a	permanent	forward-deployed	military	force	within	striking	distance	of	such	contested	waters.”	
The	Xisha	maritime	garrison	is	commanded	by	a	senior	captain	(equivalent	to	an	Army	senior	colonel),	the	former	head	of	the	PLAN’s	1st	Marine	Brigade,	a	main	force	combat	unit	in	the	South	Sea	Fleet.		The	number	of	troops	in	the	maritime	garrison	is	unknown,	but	a	2002	report	from	Taiwan	stated	that	China	has	deployed	around	590	troops	on	the	features	in	controls	in	the	Spratlys	(while	Vietnam	had	around	2020).		The	Ministry	of	Defense	spokesman	acknowledged	the	difference	between	the	two	garrisons	stating,	“the	Sansha	military	garrison	and	Xisha	maritime	garrison	are	separate	military	organs	executing	duties	according	to	their	respective	responsibilities…	the	Xisha	maritime	garrison…	is	responsible	for	maritime	defense	and	military	combat.”	What,	then,	is	the	significance	of	the	establishment	of	the	Sansha	garrison?		First,	from	a	military	perspective,	it	is	a	minor	development.		It	likely	will	not	command	any	combat	units	nor	will	it	result	in	a	substantial	increase	in	the	Chinese	forces	in	the	South	China	Sea.		Rather,	it	is	designed	to	enhance	coordination	with	the	local	government.		Its	importance	is	political,	part	of	what	the	China	Daily	unabashedly	described	as	China’s	effort,	“to	display	its	sovereignty	over	the	South	China	Sea.”	Second,	because	the	PLA	has	maintained	a	military	presence	on	the	features	it	holds	in	the	South	China	Sea	for	decades,	the	creation	of	the	garrison	does	not	support	claims	about	the	growing	role	of	the	PLA	in	Chinese	foreign	policy	or	policy	in	the	South	China	Sea.	Instead,	the	establishment	of	the	garrison	reflects	the	bureaucratic	upgrade	of	an	existing	department	following	a	change	in	the	administrative	status	of	the	associated	locality.	Third,	militarily,	any	forces	on	the	islands	and	reefs	in	the	South	China	Sea	are	vulnerable	and	hard	to	defend.	As	retired	U.S.	Rear	Admiral	Mike	McDevitt	has	said,	“Putting	garrisons	on	Woody	Island	or	elsewhere	in	the	Paracels	would	effectively	maroon	these	guys,	so	the	only	advantage	would	be	just	showing	the	flag	—	to	say,	‘We	are	serious.’”	Finally,	the	general	reaction	to	the	creation	of	the	Sansha	garrison	reflects	the	limited	understanding	among	analysts	and	observers	of	the	PLA’s	organization	despite	Beijing’s	efforts	to	describe	the	structure	of	the	Chinese	armed	forces	in	biannual	white	papers	and	media	reports.	For	example,	none	of	the	Pentagon’s	annual	reports	to	Congress	on	Chinese	military	power	have	ever	mentioned	this	level	of	organization.		In	the	case	of	Sansha,	the	Chinese	government	could	have	better	explained	its	decision,	while	commentators	might	have	examined	what	garrisons	actually	do	before	jumping	to	ill-founded	conclusions.	
